This paper studies the welfare cost of in ‡ation in a frictional monetary economy with endogenous price dispersion, which is generated by sellers posting prices and buyers costly searching for low prices. We identify three channels through which in ‡ation a¤ects welfare. The interaction of real balance channel and price posting channel generates a welfare cost, at 10% annual in ‡ation, equal to 3.23% of steady state consumption; if either channel is shut down, the welfare cost decreases to less than 0.15%. Search channel reduces welfare cost by more than 50%. The aggregate e¤ect of in ‡ation on welfare is nonmonotonic.
Introduction
There is a long tradition of thinking that the welfare cost of in ‡ation has two major sources: the opportunity cost of holding money and price dispersion. In this paper, we revisit the classical question on welfare cost in a general equilibrium monetary model with price dispersion. We build on the monetary search framework of Lagos and Wright (2005) , and integrate the analysis of endogenous price dispersion in a frictional goods market by Burdett and Judd (1983) .
In this economy, buyers want to carry money despite a positive opportunity cost because they can use it as a medium of exchange in the bilateral trade market with frictions, in which other means of payment are infeasible due to anonymity and imperfect monitoring technology. Search frictions not only make money essential, but also grant sellers monopolistic power to set prices. In the frictional market, buyers can only observe a subset of prices, and they need to pay a cost to acquire more price information. Therefore, when a seller serves buyers who do not search for lower prices, he is able to sell at prices higher than marginal cost, but then the seller can also post a lower price to attract buyers who search.
This trade-o¤ faced by sellers generates endogenous price dispersion.
We identify three channels through which in ‡ation a¤ects welfare: real balance, price posting, and endogenous search. When in ‡ation increases, holding money becomes more costly, and buyers reduce their real balances. As a result, consumption decreases, and so does welfare. This is the real balance channel. At the same time, buyers also want to search harder, in order to …nd a lower price and purchase more goods. So search channel increases consumption and welfare. Price posting channel does not respond to in ‡ation directly, but changes with the other two channels. Sellers certainly post di¤erent prices if buyers bring less money to trade or search harder for low prices, and price changes a¤ect consumption and welfare subsequently.
In order to understand the aggregate e¤ect of in ‡ation on welfare, as well as the e¤ects through each individual channel, we calibrate the model to match U.S. data on money demand and price dispersion, measure the welfare cost of in ‡ation following Lucas (2000) , and decompose the aggregate e¤ect of in ‡ation by shutting down each channel separately. Taking the economy with zero in ‡ation as a benchmark, we …nd the welfare cost of 10% annual in ‡ation is worth 3:23% of consumption. However, if either real balance or price posting channel is shut down, welfare cost sharply decreases to less than 0:15% of consumption.
The decomposition exercise shows that the large welfare cost of in ‡ation is caused by the interaction of real balance and price posting channel. If in ‡ation increases, real balance and consumption decrease. Since buyer's expenditure is not sensitive to price changes, sellers respond by posting even higher prices, which further reduces consumption and welfare.
Search channel has two e¤ects on welfare. First, if buyers search more, they are more likely to trade at lower prices, and hence consumption increases. Second, search activities increase competition among sellers, and drive down overall real price level. Our quantitative exercise suggests that the second e¤ect of search channel on welfare is more important, and it reduces the welfare cost of in ‡ation by 50%.
The model predicts a nonmonotonic e¤ect of in ‡ation on welfare. Even at the Friedman rule, sellers still post prices above marginal cost. A small deviation from the Friedman rule can improve welfare by encouraging buyers to search harder for low prices and increasing competition among sellers. However, as the cost of holding money increases more, real balance drops quickly, and it has a …rst-order e¤ect on consumption. The joint negative e¤ect of real balance and price posting channel becomes larger than the positive e¤ect of search channel, and welfare decreases with in ‡ation. This paper …ts into a long literature since Bailey (1956) , which studies the welfare cost of in ‡ation through real balance channel. Among recent papers, Cooley and Hansen (1989) use a cash-in-advance constraint to introduce money into a real business cycle and …nd the welfare cost of 10% in ‡ation equals to 0.52% of steady state consumption. Lucas (2000) surveys research on welfare cost in di¤erent frameworks, and estimates the welfare cost of 10% in ‡ation to be less than 1% of real income. We …nd a larger welfare cost, but the e¤ect of in ‡ation through real balance channel alone is in the same range as previous …ndings. Lagos-Wright framework, and study the welfare cost (or gain) of price dispersion. In another paper by Head and Kumar (2005) , they build on the large household framework in Shi (1997) , and study the relationship between in ‡ation and price dispersion. They also discuss welfare and present similar qualitative …ndings as in our paper, but no quantitative results since they do not do calibration. In a cashless search model with price dispersion, Benabou (1988 Benabou ( , 1992 and Diamond (1993) study the theoretical connection between in ‡ation and e¢ ciency.
They ignore the real balance channel, which greatly a¤ects welfare.
There are other frictions which can also generate price dispersion, such as Calvo pricing and menu costs in the New Keynesian literature. Burstein and Hellwig (2008) study a variety of New Keynesian models, and calculate a welfare cost, only under Calvo pricing, similar to the magnitude in Lagos and Wright (2005) . Craig and Rocheteau (2008b) combine the Lagos-Wright framework with menu costs and …nd the optimal in ‡ation rate is away from the Friedman rule. Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) combine Lagos-Wright with Calvo pricing and …nd that the welfare distortions created by search frictions are of similar magnitude as the distortions created by the New Keynesian friction. All three papers include real balance and price posting channels. We also study endogenous search channel, and focus on the welfare implication of the interaction of di¤erent channels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the environment of the model, and we solve for monetary equilibrium in Section 3. Then, Section 4 presents quantitative analysis, including calibration exercise and welfare analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper. Additional technical details and proofs are in the Appendix.
The Environment
Time is discrete. Each period is divided into two subperiods. In the …rst subperiod, there is a decentralized market (hereafter DM) and goods are traded bilaterally. In the second subperiod, the market is centralized (hereafter CM) and there is Walrasian trade in the market. A continuum of buyers and sellers, each with measure one, live forever. Following Rocheteau and Wright (2005) , assume both types produce and consume in the CM, but they act di¤erently in the DM. Buyers want to consume but cannot produce, while sellers can produce but do not want to consume. All economic agents are assumed to be anonymous in the DM, and there is imperfect monitoring or record keeping technology. These assumptions, as well as the lack of double coincidence of wants, make a medium of exchange, which is called money, essential. 1 Money is storable and perfectly divisible.
M t denotes money supply in period t, and it grows according to
M t+1 is money supply in the next period t+1. New money is injected by lump-sum transfers, or withdrawn by lump-sum taxes if < 0, at the beginning of the CM. For simplicity, we assume that transfer or tax goes equally to each buyer. 2 In period t, the buyer's instantaneous utility function is
where q t is the quantity of the DM goods consumed, x t is the quantity of the CM goods consumed, and h t is the quantity produced. The CM goods are produced one-for-one using labor. The lifetime utility of a buyer is
Assume that u(q) has the CRRA form with risk aversion coe¢ cient < 1 and u(0) = 0, u 0 (q) > 0, u 00 (q) < 0 for all q. Also assume v 0 (x) > 0 and v 00 (x) < 0 for all x, and there exists x > 0 such that v 0 (x ) = 1. Similarly, the instantaneous utility of a seller is Figure 1 : Timeline where q t , x t , and h t have the same de…nitions as in the buyer's utility function. 3 The lifetime utility of a seller is
In the CM, the price of consumption good x is normalized to one. The relative price of money in terms of x is t in period t and the price of x t in terms of money is 1= t . Then, the CM consumption good becomes the numeraire in the economy. is the discounting factor between today's DM and tomorrow's CM. This paper focuses on the case in which < 1 + .
Assume in ‡ation is forecasted perfectly and the Fisher equation holds. Hence, the nominal interest rate i is equal to (1 + )= , and < 1 + implies i > 0.
Search and Price Dispersion
This paper studies a market structure in which sellers post prices and buyers know the price distribution but cannot observe all the prices. Burdett and Judd (1983) to producing and selling any quantity of the goods at the price posted. Every buyer then chooses his search intensity by sampling one or two prices from the price distribution of the DM goods. 4 After that, he still needs to decide how much money to spend in a trade.
Finally, each buyer trades with one seller. The seller produces, the buyer consumes, and then they return to the CM. 
Buyer' s Optimization Problem
When a buyer enters the CM, he needs to decide whether he is going to observe one or two prices in the following DM. This choice a¤ects the buyer's decision on production, consumption, and money holding in the CM. A type-1 buyer faces the following optimization problem in the recursive form.
represents the value function in the CM and V b 1 (ẑ 1 ) is the value of observing one price in the DM. The buyer produces the CM goods using labor as input, consumes, and adjusts his real balance of the next periodẑ 1 . T = M is the transfer payment made by the government.
A type-2 buyer chooses to observe a second price with cost k in the DM, and his optimization problem in the CM is characterized as
We de…ne V b 1 and V b 2 explicitly later. Therefore, at the beginning of the CM, a buyer chooses the option with the higher value.
Let us look at W b 1 (z) …rst. Substitute h in the value function by the budget constraint, and (1) becomes
where
. The buyer's optimal decision ofẑ 1 does not depend on his current money holding. Similarly, we have
and
This convenient result is due to the assumption of quasi-linear utility function in the CM, which yields a degenerate distribution of buyers'money holdings in the DM.
Now we turn to the DM. The value function of a type-1 buyer 
2 is the distribution of transaction price, i.e., the lower of two observed prices.
In order to solve for d (p; z), the buyer's optimal expenditure function, we apply the linearity of W b (z) from (5) and rewrite (6) and (7) as
It is obvious that d (p; z) is the solution to the following problem. 
Proof. see Appendix.
The risk aversion coe¢ cient characterizes the buyer's price elasticity of demand. When is less than one, the buyer's price elasticity of demand is greater than one, and the expenditure elasticity is less than one. Then, his expenditure on the DM goods d (p; z) decreases as he faces a higher price level. A buyer cannot spend more than his monetary constraint at low price levels even though he desires to do so.p is the cuto¤ price level at which the buyer's monetary constraint starts to relax, and he spends less than the total money holding when the price is higher thanp: This situation is illustrated in Figure 2 .
We substitute (8) and (9) into (3) and (4), and the buyer's Bellman's equations in the CM become
The optimal decision of x satis…es v 0 (x ) = 1, and it does not depend onẑ 1 orẑ 2 .
According to Lemma (1), d (p; z) has di¤erent expressions depending on the relationship between p andp: Therefore, in order to characterize the buyer's optimal decision onẑ 1 and z 2 , we …rst need to establish the following result characterizing the relationship ofp and Z F .
Lemma 2
In the optimization problem in (10) and (11), both type-1 and type-2 buyers always choose real balancesẑ 1 andẑ 2 such thatp 1 > p andp 2 > p.
The intuition of Lemma 2 is straightforward. Consider type-1 buyers as an example.
If the cuto¤ pricep 1 is smaller than the lower limit of price distribution, the buyer's real balance does not a¤ect the surplus from trade in the DM since d (p; z 1 ) = d (p). The marginal bene…t of bringing more money to the DM is zero, while the marginal cost is still positive. Thus, a buyer wants to reduce his real balance until there is a positive marginal gain related to the action of carrying money, which only happens whenp 1 exceeds p. This intuition is true for both type-1 and type-2 buyers.
We proceed to characterize the optimal decisions of buyers. Taking F (p) as given, a type-1 buyer choosesẑ 1 to solve the maximization problem in (10) . We can rewrite the buyer's value function in the CM as the following
and the terms unrelated toẑ 1 are omitted. So the buyer's optimal real balanceẑ 1 satis…es
The buyer's marginal gain of holding money, which is the left hand side of (13), decreases asẑ 1 increases. Holding everything else constant, there is less marginal gain as a buyer holds more money. From a partial equilibrium point of view, as the money growth rate increases, the nominal interest rate rises, the marginal cost of holding money gets bigger, and the buyer decides to carry a smaller real balance.
The price distribution F (p) also a¤ects the buyer's money holding in the following way.
IfF (p) …rst-order stochastically dominates F (p); a buyer carries less money withF (p):
Because he faces a market with a smaller probability of getting a low price, implying a smaller probability of becoming cash constrained and a smaller marginal gain of holding extra money. Therefore, the marginal bene…t of carrying money is smaller than the marginal cost, and the buyer wants to reduce his money holding.
Next, a type-2 buyer choosesẑ 2 to solve the maximization problem in (11) and we can rewrite the value function in a similar way as
Then, the buyer's optimal real balanceẑ 2 satis…es the following FOC
and the same intuition asẑ 1 applies.
Seller' s Optimization Problem
In the CM, the seller's value function is
whereẑ is the seller's real money balance of the next period. In the CM, a seller produces and consumes the CM goods and chooses the amount of money to bring to the next DM.
Similar to the buyer's problem, the seller's optimal quantity of the CM consumption x satis…es v 0 (x ) = 1: We also have W s (z) = z + W s (0); and the seller's optimal real balancê z does not depend on z.
We then turn to the seller's value function in the DM, which is
where (p) is the seller's pro…t function, and it does not depend on his money holding. We substitute (17) into (16), and an immediate result for the seller isẑ = 0 since 1 + > .
The seller does not bring any money to the DM because he does not want to consume, and the pro…t is not a¤ected by his real balance.
In the DM, a seller takes the buyer's optimal real balances, the measure of di¤erent types of buyers, and the price distribution in the market as given. He chooses a price to maximize the following pro…t function
where z 1 and z 2 represent the buyer's real balance and is the measure of type-2 buyers in the same period of the seller's price posting problem, and d is the buyer's optimal expenditure on the DM goods. With probability 1 , the seller is the only one that a buyer visits, and with probability ; he is competing with another seller for the same buyer. In that situation, the seller can have a successful trade only if his price is lower than his competitor's price, which happens with probability 1
the seller's surplus from trade.
We proceed to characterize the upper and lower limit of F (p): Facing the price distribution in the DM, the highest price posted by a seller must be equal to or higher than p; in which case the seller expects to trade with buyers who only visit him, i.e. type-1 buyers only. Then, 
where p 0 is the highest price that the seller chooses to post given F (p) and its support Z F . Notice that this is the same problem faced by every seller, and the optimal choice of p 0 does not depend on distribution F: Therefore, the upper limit of F (p); p is determined by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Given the optimal money holding of type-1 buyers z 1 and the buyer's optimal expenditure rule d (p; z 1 ), the upper limit of the price distribution F (p) is given by p =
Proof. see Appendix. hand, the buyer actually cannot spend more than the amount of money he carries into the DM, and the monetary constraint is binding for prices lower thanp 1 : For higher prices, the buyer wants to spend less, and the constraint is not binding at all.
When the nominal interest rate is high, it is relatively more costly to hold money for buyers, and it is more likely to havep <p 1 : This case is illustrated in Figure 3 . When the interest rate is low and carrying money is less costly, it is possible to havep >p 1 ; in which case the seller can earn the highest possible pro…t atp. The next lemma characterizes the price distribution in the DM.
Lemma 4 Given the buyer's optimal choices on real balance z 1 and z 2 and the measure of type-2 buyers , the price posting equilibrium distribution F (p) in the DM is uniquely characterized as
(ii) if = 1; F (p) is concentrated at c:
is connected, and for any p 2 Z F ;
where p is given in Lemma 3 and p satis…es
If every buyer samples just one price, i.e. = 0, each seller behaves like a monopolist, and they all post a price as high as possible in order to extract all the surplus from trade. If more buyers search harder by sampling two prices, F (p) increases. The upper limit of the price distribution does not change, since it is determined by type-1 buyer's money holding alone, while the lower limit decreases due to more intense competition. The price dispersion measured as the length of the support of F (p) increases. Increased search behavior intensi…es competition among sellers; thus, it is more likely for a buyer to get a relatively low price, and in general the average price level gets lower.
If the nominal interest rate increases and type-1 buyers bring less money to the DM, p
increases, but the e¤ect on F (p) depends on . When is less than one and the buyer's demand elasticity is greater than one, sellers respond by increasing the highest price in the market. Then, by the seller's equal pro…t condition, the overall price level in the DM rises and F (p) decreases.
Equilibrium
Before de…ning equilibrium, we close the model by characterizing the buyer's entry decision.
When a buyer enters the CM, he …rst needs to choose to be a type-1 or type-2 buyer, and then makes other optimal choices based on his initial decision on type. The economy can only reach an equilibrium if the marginal buyer is indi¤erent between being type-1 or type-2. Given an existing composition of the buyer's population, there is not a single buyer who wants to change his type. That is, we need to have W
2 (z) in order to make 2 (0; 1). Plug in (10) and (11) and we de…ne
to be the gain of observing two prices instead of one. Then,
A buyer can get a better deal by sampling one more price, but he also needs to pay the extra opportunity cost of carrying more money. In order to have an interior solution of , the above gain needs to be equal to the cost k. Intuitively, if the gain from sampling the second price is less than k, we have = 0 and all buyers are type-1. If the gain is larger than the cost, = 1 and all buyers choose to be type-2. Notice that even though does not enter (19) directly, it appears in the expression of the price distribution F (p) in equilibrium.
De…nition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium (SME) is a pro…le fF ; z 1 ; z 2 ; x ; h ; d ; g satisfying the following conditions: In equilibrium, money bears value and circulates because buyers can use it as means of payment in the DM and sellers may use it in exchange for consumption goods in the CM.
Equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that all ex ante homogeneous sellers post the same price distribution. In general, two kinds of equilibrium may potentially exist: one with a degenerate price distribution in the DM and one with a nondegenerate price distribution.
Proposition 1 shows that the …rst kind of equilibrium does not exist.
Proposition 1 If 1 + > , there exists no SME with = 0 or = 1.
If all the buyers choose to be type-2 and = 1, the equilibrium price distribution becomes degenerate and concentrated at the marginal cost. Then, any type-2 buyer would want to deviate and switch to type-1, since the marginal gain from observing one more price is zero but he has to pay a non-zero cost. The equilibrium then collapses.
If all the buyers sample just one price and = 0, the equilibrium price distribution again becomes degenerate and concentrated at the highest possible price, i.e. the seller's monopoly price. When posting this price, sellers do not take into account the buyer's opportunity cost of holding money, because it is a sunk cost in the DM. Then, when the buyer chooses the optimal real balance in the CM, he …nds that the marginal cost of carrying money to the DM is positive while the marginal gain is zero, since all the surplus from DM trade is exploited by the seller. Therefore, the buyer chooses z 1 = 0 and this is no longer a monetary equilibrium.
In the next proposition, we establish the existence of a stationary monetary equilibrium with a nondegenerate price distribution Proposition 2 For 1 + > , there exists k > 0, and for k < k, SME with nondegenerate price distribution exists.
This proposition is formally proved in the Appendix, and here we discuss the basic intuition behind the argument. First, we show that the price distribution posted by sellers in the DM is decreasing, in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance, with respect to the real balance that type-1 and type-2 buyers are expected to hold. If buyers of either type carry a larger real balance, the monetary constraint in the buyer's optimal expenditure problem in the DM is relaxed. This implies that buyers now have more money to spend when they meet sellers with relatively low prices, and hence low-price sellers get more pro…t compared to high-price sellers. In order for the equal pro…t condition to hold for di¤erent prices, sellers must shift down the price distribution. While the average number of type-1 buyers served by each seller stays the same, the expected number of type-2 buyers is reduced at low-price sellers relative to high-price sellers. So sellers remain indi¤erent between low and high prices.
Then, we show that the amount of real balance carried by buyers in the DM decreases with the price distribution posted by sellers. If buyers are facing a lower price distribution, in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance, the probability of being cash constrained when buying the DM good is higher, since they are more likely to meet a seller with low price. As a result, the marginal bene…t of carrying one additional unit of real balance into the DM increases, and then buyers simply want to carry more money.
The intuition above shows that the amount of real balance that buyers want to carry is an increasing function of the amount that they are expected to carry by sellers. Moreover, we can show that the buyer's optimal choice of real balance is bounded above, since no one wants to carry more money when it can no longer help to relax buyer's monetary constraint in the DM. Then, from the …xed point theorem in Tarski (1955), we can prove that for a given measure of type-2 buyers 2 (0; 1), there exists optimal real balances for both type-1 and type-2 buyers.
Finally, we show that type-2 buyer's surplus from the DM trade is larger than type-1 buyer's surplus. Intuitively, type-2 buyers carry a larger real balance and face a lower transaction price in the DM, and the bene…t outweighs the additional cost they su¤er from in ‡ation. After paying a positive search cost, the payo¤ of both types is the same and no one wants to deviate from existing price sampling decision. Therefore, there exists 2 (0; 1)
such that ( ) k = 0, which in turn determines the optimal real balances z 1 and z 2 for type-1 and type-2 buyers, the DM price distribution F resulting from seller's optimal pricing decision, and all the other endogenous variables. Even though we cannot formally prove the uniqueness of equilibrium, we can make a similar argument as in Wright (2010).
When there are more than one that satis…es ( ) k = 0, the biggest is the one that yields the highest surplus for type-2 buyers, hence the equilibrium measure of type-2 buyers.
Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to match money demand and price dispersion in U.S. data, and quantitatively measure the aggregate e¤ect of in ‡ation on welfare, as well as the e¤ects through each individual channel. We also check the robustness of the results by considering alternative calibration targets and di¤erent time periods.
Calibration
We assume the following functional forms for preferences and production technology: The time period of the model is set to be one year. We choose this length of time in order to compare the results with those in previous studies, and also because of data availability.
We need to calibrate three key parameters, the buyer's search cost k and preference parameters and A. The …rst target we use is money demand, a sample of 101 years, from 1900 to 2000, including the not seasonally adjusted nominal GDP and M1 5 and short-term (6 month) commercial paper rate as the nominal interest rate. 6 In the model, money demand, de…ned as L(i) = M=P Y , represents real balance as a function of nominal interest rate. Real balance M=P is proportional to the total real output Y with a factor of proportionality L(i), which depends on the opportunity cost of holding money. Per capita real output in the CM is x = A; and real output per trade in the DM is
(1 )
5 Nominal GDP is taken from the Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to Present (1970) and the GDPA series from the Citibase database. Money supply is M1, as of December of each year, and is not seasonally adjusted. It is from the Historical Statistics of the United States (1970), Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , and the FRED II database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 6 From 1900 to 1997, the short-term commercial paper rate is taken from Friedman and Schwartz (1982) , Economic Report of the President (1996), and Economic Report of the President (2003) . From 1998 to 2000 it is the short-term 90-day AA credit rate from the Federal Reserve Board.
So the money demand function is
Concerning the calibration target for search cost k, there are many empirical studies in which the magnitude of price dispersion is measured by relative price variability (RPV), de…ned as
where R = log(p= In order to numerically solve the model, we …rst …x the measure of type-2 buyers and also z 1 and z 2 , and compute the uniquely determined price distribution F using Lemma 4.
Then, we substitute F back into (13) and (15) and solve for z 1 and z 2 . Finally, we insert both z 1 ; z 2 and F into (19) and search for 2 (0; 1) that solves ( ) = k. 
Results
The baseline calibration gives a very small search cost k = 0:0043, and also a very small risk aversion coe¢ cient = 0:1181. The relative size of the CM with respect to the DM implies A = 0:4916. The discount factor is = 0:9615. The markup in the DM is de…ned as
The baseline calibration predicts the DM markup to be 9:72%, which implies a lot of competition among sellers in the market. The overall markup is the average of two markets, weighted by the shares of output, which is 2:4% in the baseline calibration, implying about 25% of total real output being produced in the DM. In the baseline calibration, we can only …nd a unique SME. In equilibrium, as nominal interest rate increases, buyers bring less real balance to the DM. Since < 1, the buyer's price elasticity of demand is greater than one. As they bring less money to the DM, their optimal expenditures decrease and are bound by real balance. The buyer's surplus from trade also decreases, which encourages them to search less. On the other hand, equilibrium price distribution becomes more dispersed with higher in ‡ation, which gives buyers incentive to search harder. Therefore, the model displays a nonmonotonic e¤ect of in ‡ation on search intensity, and hence a nonmonotonic relationship between in ‡ation and price dispersion, as shown in Figure 5 .
Welfare Cost of In ‡ation
Following Lucas (2000), we measure the welfare cost of increasing annual in ‡ation from zero percent to percent by compensating consumption. For any , total welfare is given by
where 2[v(x ) x ] is the total surplus from CM trade. The next two integral terms are the surplus from trade in the DM, subtracting search cost. We can also write the total welfare at zero in ‡ation, with consumption reduced by a factor of in both the CM and DM, as
So we measure the welfare cost of percent in ‡ation as the value 1 0 that solves W( ) = W 0 (0). Every buyer and seller need to give up 1 0 percent of their consumption to be indi¤erent between the two economies with di¤erent in ‡ation rates.
In the baseline calibration, we …nd the welfare cost of 10% annual in ‡ation is worth 3.23%
of consumption in the economy with zero in ‡ation, which is relatively larger compared to earlier …ndings by Cooley and Hansen (1989) buyers need to pay a cost to search for prices, sellers have monopolistic power, and can post prices higher than marginal cost. This is price posting channel, which responds to in ‡ation indirectly through other channels. Finally, with higher in ‡ation, buyers search harder for low-price sellers, and this is search channel. Higher search intensity increases competition among sellers, drives down overall price level, and increases the DM consumption and welfare.
The aggregate e¤ect of in ‡ation on welfare is shown in Figure 6 . A small deviation from the Friedman rule leads to welfare improvement. Even if it is costless to hold money, sellers still set prices above marginal cost, as Burdett and Judd (1984) show in a cashless economy. If holding money becomes costly, buyers have an incentive to search harder for low prices, and then average transaction price drops and welfare increases. At very low level of in ‡ation, the positive e¤ect on welfare through search channel dominates the negative e¤ect increasing, real balance drops quickly, and its …rst-order e¤ect on consumption soon drives up welfare cost. When almost all buyers sample two prices, the price distribution in the DM is pushed toward marginal cost pricing, and welfare increases marginally. Therefore, the e¤ect of in ‡ation on welfare is nonmonotonic.
In order to study each individual channel and their interactions, we decompose the welfare cost of in ‡ation in the following way. In the baseline calibration, we solve monetary equilibrium at di¤erent in ‡ation rates. We keep two channels at their equilibrium values but hold the third channel constant, and recalculate the welfare cost. By comparing with the original values in Figure 6 , we can isolate the contribution of the third channel. The e¤ect through search channel is illustrated in Figure 9 , and one observes welfare gain of 0:1% of consumption at 10% in ‡ation rate. This implies that welfare gain through search channel is even less than the welfare loss due to search cost. However, it does not necessarily lead to a trivial e¤ect of endogenous search on welfare. Equation (20) shows that search intensity a¤ects total welfare in two ways. It directly a¤ects total surplus from the DM trade, and indirectly a¤ects real balance and price distribution. Figure 10 presents the change in welfare cost when we completely remove endogenous search decision instead of holding the fraction of type-2 buyers constant, and hence this graph shows the total e¤ect of search channel on welfare. Without endogenous search, the welfare cost of 10% in ‡ation increases to 6:99%. This …nding implies that endogenous search lowers the welfare cost by more than 50%.
From the above decomposition exercise, we conclude that the large welfare cost of in ‡ation found in this model is caused by the interaction of real balance and price posting channel.
As in ‡ation increases, real balance drops, and the DM consumption decreases. Since the buyer's price elasticity of demand is greater than one, sellers respond by posting even higher prices, which further decreases quantity traded in the DM and welfare. Finally, we also consider alternative calibration targets and di¤erent data time periods. Table 1 presents calibration results, using price dispersion statistics from Parsley (1996) as Target 2 and the DM markup of 30% as Target 3, and the welfare cost of 10% in ‡ation.
Parsley (1996) …nds more dispersed price distribution, and so Target 2 implies a bigger search cost, less competition in the DM, and a larger welfare cost. Similar intuition applies to a larger DM markup. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a search-theoretic monetary model to incorporate real balance, price posting, and endogenous search. In Head et al (2012) , this framework has been proven to …t empirical evidence on price changes well, and is a good tool for welfare analysis. We quantify the welfare cost of in ‡ation, and study di¤erent channels through which in ‡ation a¤ects welfare. Calibrating the model to match U.S. data on money demand and price dispersion, we …nd that the welfare cost of 10% annual in ‡ation is worth 3:23% of consumption in zero in ‡ation economy, which is larger than previous …ndings in the literature. However, if either real balance or price posting channel is shut down, the welfare cost signi…cantly decreases to less than 0:15% of consumption, and is consistent with previous …ndings.
The big welfare loss is driven by the interaction of real balance and price posting channel.
With higher in ‡ation, buyers respond by holding lower real balance, and sellers respond by posting higher prices. The total e¤ect through two channels decreases consumption and welfare signi…cantly. Buyers search more intensively when in ‡ation gets higher, and endogenous search channel improves welfare mostly by intensifying competition among sellers. The aggregate e¤ect of in ‡ation on welfare through all three channels is nonmonotonic.
This paper models search frictions as the only driving force for buyers to hold money and sellers to post prices, and it is also the source of endogenous price dispersion in equilibrium.
This modeling choice is neat and useful in incorporating di¤erent channels into one uni…ed environment. There are other frictions that a¤ect seller's price setting behavior and price dispersion, such as menu costs. In a related paper, Burdett and Menzio (2014) show that both menu costs and search frictions contribute to price dispersion, but search frictions are more important than menu costs in matching empirical data. However, it is not clear yet menu costs are less important in the context of studying the welfare cost of in ‡ation, especially with interactions with search frictions, and this is a topic for future research.
=p is a decreasing function in p and @d (p)=@p < 0. Hence, there existsp j such that d (p j ) = z j for z j > 0; j = 1; 2:
For p <p j ; d (p) > z j and u 0 (z j =p)=p 1 > 0: Buyers want to spend more, but are subject
It is straightforward to verify that @p j =@z j < 0:
Proof of Lemma 2.
In this proof, I use z j > 0; j = 1; 2 to denote the optimal real balance of type-1 and type-2 buyers, respectively. In the following, we focus on type-1 buyers and the proof for type-2 buyers can be derived similarly. We proceed by contradiction and assume thatp 1 p at z 1 :
We …rst consider the situation in whichp 1 < p:
We plug it into (12) and omit all the terms unrelated to z 1 , and the buyer's optimization problem can be rewritten as
The …rst order condition with respect to z 1 evaluated at z 1 is @L=@z 1 = i < 0, which is a contradiction to z 1 being the optimal real balance. Then, we consider the situation of
We want to solve for @L=@z 1 . When z 1 approaches z 1 from below,p(z 1 ) approaches p from above since @p 1 =@z 1 < 0, and we can rewrite (21) as 
The seller wants to choose p such that
which is the …rst order condition of the seller's pro…t maximization problem. We can derive 
Therefore, seller wants to post the upper limit p = maxfp 1 ;pg:
Proof of Lemma 4.
According to Lemma 3, there is a unique price that maximizes (p); so every seller posts p: If there is another nondegenerate F (p); its support Z F is connected. This conclusion follows directly from Lemma 1 in Burdett and Judd (1983) . (p) must be the same for all p 2 Z F ;
However, for any p such that
This is a contradiction. Therefore, F (p) concentrated at c is the unique equilibrium price distribution in the seller's price posting game. 
The above equation determines a unique F (p) for each p. In particular, (p) = ( p) determines p, which satis…es
Proof of Proposition 1.
First, we consider the case of = 0. Suppose an SME exists for an economy with 1 + > . Because = 0, the equilibrium price distribution in the DM, F (p) must be concentrated at p. 
When

Proof of Proposition 2.
We want to show that there exists 2 (0; 1), z 1 > 0, z 2 > 0, and F satisfying ( ) = k, (13), (15) , and Lemma (4). We …rst show that given 2 (0; 1), there exists z 1 , z 2 , and F such that type-1 buyers choose z 1 = z 1 and type-2 buyers choose z 2 = z 2 given the price distribution F (p; z 1 ; z 2 ). Then, we show that we can …nd 2 (0; 1) such that ( ) = k. We proceed in four steps.
Claim 1 Let z and z be de…ned bŷ p(z ) =p andp( z ) = p;
wherep is de…ned in Lemma (3) and p is de…ned in
De…ne Z = (z 1 ; z 2 ). Then, for Z 0 = (z 10 ; z 20 ) and Z 1 = (z 11 ; z 21 ) such that 0 < Z 0 < Z 1 ( z ; z ), F (p; Z 0 ) …rst-order stochastically dominates F (p; Z 1 ). For Z 0 and Z 1 such that ( z ; z ) Z 0 < Z 1 , then F (p; Z 0 ) = F (p; Z 1 ).
Proof. First, consider the case in which ( z ; z ) Z 0 < Z 1 . Then, the price distribution is F (p; Z ) = 1 1 2
with support p ; p , where p =p and p = p as de…ned in (24) . In this case, F (p; Z 0 ) = F (p; Z 1 ) for all Z 0 and Z 1 such that ( z ; z ) Z 0 < Z 1 .
Second, consider the case z z 1i z z 2i for i = 0; 1 and Z 0 < Z 1 . In this case, the price distribution is F (p; Z ) = with support p ; p , where p =p and p is the solution to Third, consider the case (z ; z ) Z 0 < Z 1 ( z ; z ). The price distribution is 
